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Cosmopolitanism and global citizenship

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Abstract. The author argues that we have obligations to our fellow citizens as well as to those outside our community. Since these obligations can conflict and since neither automatically trumps the other, the author provides the general principles needed to resolve the conflict. While rejecting the notion of global citizenship, he argues for a globally oriented national citizenship and spells out its political and institutional implications.

A few years ago when Richard Goldstone was appointed Chief Prosecutor for the Yugoslav and Rwanda war crimes tribunals, he ran into Edward Heath, ex-British Prime Minister. Goldstone told him about his new job whereupon Heath asked him why he had accepted ‘such a ridiculous job’. When the surprised Goldstone tried to explain the importance of bringing war criminals to justice, Heath rejoined that if people wanted to murder one another, it was none of his business as long as they did so in their own country. Goldstone found later that Heath was candidly stating what many leading Western politicians were saying in private.¹

When a group of leading American activists lambasted the chief executive of a well-known multinational corporation for paying low wages to his employees in developing countries and bribing and coercing their governments, he rejoined that his sole duty was to his shareholders, that alleviating the poverty in developing countries was not his business but that of the leaders of the country involved, that no Western country had ever depended on external help, and that it was about time developing countries stopped blackmailing the West.

Many of us think that politicians and heads of multinational corporations who take such views are profoundly mistaken. In this article I show why and what obligations we have to people outside our political community and how best to discharge them.²

* This article is based on my E.H. Carr memorial lecture delivered at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. I’m most grateful to Ken Booth, Steve Smith, Mick Cox and Nicholas Wheeler for their helpful comments.

¹ Cited by Mary Kaldor, ch. 5, p. 131, in H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor (eds.), *Global Civil Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

² Throughout the article I use the terms ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ interchangeably. Although the two terms sometimes convey different ideas, and it might seem appropriate to use the term ‘obligation’ to refer to what I call ‘special duties’, the distinction between the two in philosophical and popular discourse is not sharp enough to allow their neat separation.

Duties to others

Human beings are endowed with several distinct capacities which mark them out from the rest of the natural world. These include the capacity to think, reflect, reason, use language, imagine things unseen, form visions of the good life, enter into moral relations with one another, fall in love, dream dreams, and so on. Although these capacities are interrelated, they are different in their nature, origins and mode of operation, and cannot all be reduced to any one of them. The capacity for rationality, often taken to be the most basic of all, does not by itself explain why humans are able to construct myths, fall in love, compose music, or dream dreams of a better life.

Thanks to these capacities, human beings are able to build a rich inner life of their own as well as a world of interpersonal relationships, and experience uniquely human emotions such as love, joy, grief, sadness, pride, shame, honour, loyalty and deep personal attachments which give richness and depth to their lives and make the latter uniquely human. They are also able to exercise self-determination, carve out spaces of freedom, understand, control and humanise their natural environment, rise above the automatic and inexorable processes of nature, create a public world of aesthetic, literary, scientific, moral, religious and other great achievements, give meaning to their lives, and introduce a wholly novel form of existence. Their humanity is not limited to and exhaustively defined by their rationality or morality as the dominant rationalist or moralist account of human beings maintains. They are certainly rational and moral beings, but they are also artistic, sensual, sexual, vulnerable and needy beings, and the interplay of all these constitutes and defines their humanity. The fact that they can experience moments of great joy as well as sadness, die for a cause as well as kill for it, is as much a part of their humanity as the fact that they can reason, imagine and create great and beautiful works of art and literature.

As beings capable of creating meaning and values and leading lives based on these, human beings deserve to be valued themselves, are worthy of respect, or have intrinsic worth.³ Worth is not a natural fact like eyes and ears but something we ascribe to or rather confer upon human beings, and we do so because we have good reasons for it. It is a moral judgement and, like all judgements, based on and can be defended by reasons and arguments. Human beings have worth because they are capable of doing worthy things, and their worth is intrinsic because it is based on capacities and achievements that are not contingent but constitutive of their humanity. Since they have worth by virtue of being human or membership of the human species, it is their species or collective entitlement. It is, of course, possible that human capacities and achievements are all trivial in the eyes of God, and that the high value we place on them reveals our species-bias. However, that does not diminish their value in *our* eyes, for we have no other standards to judge them by than those derived from as detached and objective a perspective as we can bring to bear on the subject. We cannot leap out of ourselves and judge ourselves and the world from nowhere. Even if we believed in God and looked at ourselves from His

³ For the following four paragraphs I rely on my *Rethinking Multiculturalism* (London : Macmillan, 2000), ch. 4.

point of view, we would have to rely on our own judgement as to who to accept as God, and how to define Him and interpret His intentions. Since we value human beings because of their capacities and the kind of life they are capable of leading, we reduce our species-bias by conferring value on apes and other higher forms of animal species who also display some of these capacities.

It is true that some human beings have more intelligence or reason than others, but that does not make them morally superior or more worthy. They might be less caring and compassionate, or possess less practical or intuitive intelligence, common sense or artistic ability, or be less able to relate to and love others. Since these and other capacities are both valuable and incommensurable, human beings cannot be graded or declared inherently superior or inferior. It is true that some categories of humans such as mad or mentally handicapped persons lack some of the distinctively human capacities and might appear to have less or no worth. However, they are rarely devoid of these capacities altogether, and are mad and handicapped in a way that only humans can be. Besides, they are also the sons, daughters, brothers, and friends of normal human beings, to whom they are deeply bonded and in whose worth they therefore participate. Conferring dignity and worth on such persons also tests, affirms and intensifies our general commitment to human worth for, if we are able to value them, we are even more likely to value our more fortunate fellow-humans. Furthermore, madness and mental handicap are not easy to define. Once we start denying worth to such persons, we open the way to denying it to other classes of human beings as well. Since this is a dangerous road and can be and has been grossly misused, it is better to avoid it altogether. For these and other reasons, it is both right and prudent to insist not only on the intrinsic but *equal* worth of all human beings.

We can also give other reasons why human beings should be assigned equal worth or value. They share common needs, as compelling in the case of one human being as another. They share common vulnerabilities such as mortality, susceptibility to fear, pain and frustration, and sadness at the loss of the loved ones, and these are as much a part of one person's life as of any other. They can all without an exception flourish only under certain common conditions and wither away in their absence. Although these and other commonalities do not by themselves entail equality, they imply that human beings should be treated alike in respect to them unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, and thus create a strong presumption in favour of equality. Furthermore, treating human beings equally enables them to realise their potential and help create a rich and vibrant communal life from which all benefit. And it also increases their self-worth and respect for others, and conduces to a relaxed and humane society. In these and other ways we can both make out a powerful positive case for equality and show why the criticisms of its detractors are incoherent, flimsy or untenable. Treating human beings equally does not mean that we might not admire some persons more, for that depends on their capacities and how they use them; nor that all should enjoy equal income and wealth, for human capacities vary and the incentive of inequality is often necessary to spur people to greater efforts; nor that all should possess equal political power, for that again is ruled out by the inequalities of talents and the needs of wider society. Equality implies, minimally, that we should assign equal worth to all human beings, accord them equal respect, and give equal consideration to their claims to the basic requirements of the good life.

Human beings then have equal claims to the pursuit of their well-being. Their well-being has three components; first, those social conditions without which they cannot live and flourish, such as the satisfaction of their basic needs, social and political stability, and basic civil liberties; second, those capacities without which they cannot function normally and organise their lives, such as the capacities to think, reflect, plan their lives, exercise self-restraint, and earn their living; and third, those basic impulses and drives such as the will to live, the desire to take hold of one's life, the determination to succeed and an elementary sense of pride and self-worth without which they lack the disposition to exert themselves, develop and exercise their capacities, and lead meaningful and well directed lives. Since human beings cannot realise their potential and lead fulfilling lives in the absence of these basic requirements, their absence constitutes great evils in human life. Poverty, terror, torture, systematic humiliation, grave mental harm, inhuman conditions of work, a sense of worthlessness, a paralysing sense of despair, and loss of all interest in life destroy the very substance of one's humanity and have a compelling claim on our attention. They represent conditions in which the intrinsic worth of human beings is trampled upon, and the failure to recognise them as evils and feel addressed by them is to betray a grave moral defect.

As moral beings who have compelling reasons to acknowledge the equal intrinsic worth of all human beings, we have two fundamental duties, negative and positive. We have a duty not to inflict evils on others and damage their ability to pursue their well-being. We may not therefore pursue our interests in a manner that harms theirs, use them as a mere means to our ends, treat them as if they were worthless, humiliate and manipulate them, trample upon their self-respect, or take advantage of their weakness and vulnerability. Positively, we have a duty to alleviate their suffering and render them such help as they need and which we can provide within the limits of our abilities and resources. Although the pursuit of their well-being is their responsibility and they are best equipped to decide and plan it, they might be handicapped by unfortunate circumstances, bad luck, poor upbringing, disturbed lives, lack of resources, and so on. They can do little about these, and need help. Our assistance is a response to their claims as human beings and is a matter of justice not charity. We have no duty to sacrifice our lives or vital interests for the sake of others, though we may do so if we feel so inclined, but we do have a duty to make sacrifices of what is not vitally necessary to our well-being in order to help others secure the basic conditions of theirs.

While we have duties to human beings in general, we also have duties or obligations to those to whom we are bound by special ties. The basis and content of these special duties are defined by the nature of the ties involved. Some duties are based on gratitude for the benefits received or the expectations aroused by the bonds of love and commitment that characterise the relationship, as in the case of one's duties to one's parents, siblings, children and close friends. Some duties are based on fairness and reciprocity, such as those to one's business partners and neighbours; some others rest on the demands of one's role within an organisation; yet others rest on contractual commitments or enlightened self-interest. Since all such relations occur within a particular society, the duties involved are generally specified by its conventions and moral practices and enjoy a broad consensus. The duties vary from society to society and, being general, leave room for diversity of interpretations. In one society, duties to parents include supporting them financially in difficult times

but not nursing them when ill or incapacitated; in another society, the latter is expected as a matter of course, and the failure to do so entails social opprobrium and at least some degree of personal guilt. In both societies these duties can be interpreted narrowly or widely, depending on how those involved interpret the social norms and define the demands of their relationship.

We then have both general and special duties, the former owed to all human beings, the latter to some of them. The two sets of duties have different sources, common humanity or equal worth of all humans in one case and special ties in the other. Although these two sources are related, they are distinct and mutually irreducible. Some writers, especially the ethical universalists, see the matter differently, arguing that special duties are only a species of and derived from general duties. In their view we have a general duty to promote human well-being, and this involves impartially weighing up the claims of all human beings and doing what secures the greatest good. For obvious reasons, few if any of us can meet such an exacting standard. And even if we all could, there is the obvious practical problem that when all are supposed to be responsible, no one feels a strong sense of personal responsibility and the well-being of those in need gets neglected. No child, for example, would receive adequate attention if its well-being were not made the primary responsibility of someone in particular, usually its parents. Ethical universalists therefore argue that the general duty to promote human well-being should be parcelled out among different individuals, depending on such things as their special ties, intimate knowledge, continuity of relationship, and the capacity to serve the interests of those involved. Special duties represent such a division of labour, and are basically 'an administrative device for discharging our general duties more efficiently'.⁴

The ethical universalist's reductionist account of special duties is open to fatal objections. The language of 'division of labour', 'parcelling out duties' and 'administrative device' makes sense within an organisation where someone is in overall charge and knows how best to distribute its tasks. Moral life is not at all like that. What is more, division of labour can take many different forms. The duty to care for infants, for example, can be assigned to the more experienced and loving grandparents, professional social workers or to trained foster parents rather than to the natural parents. The ethical universalist cannot explain why we generally assign it to the natural parents even when they are not as good as the other three. His account, furthermore, requires an individual to approach his parents, children or wife, not as a son, parent or husband but as a representative of humankind. This misses the singularity and uniqueness of the relationship and turns it into something wholly different. One cares for one's parents and children because of the special and uniquely personal bonds, not because *someone* should care for them and one is better placed than anyone else. And one cares for them because one loves and is committed to them, not because one has a duty to promote human well-being in general of which one's relationship with them is an instantiation. In short, special and general duties are different in nature, and the former cannot be reduced to the latter without destroying their moral specificity.

⁴ See R. Goodin, *Protecting the Vulnerable* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1985) and 'What Is So Special about our Fellow Countrymen', *Ethics*, 98 (1987), p. 685.

Human beings then have both general and special duties. The two sets of duties can be defined differently, and give rise to different kinds of moral life. One might devote one's life to pursuing the well-being of the entire humankind and pay only the minimum necessary attention to those to whom one is bound by special ties. This is, for example, what Mahatma Gandhi, Mother Teresa, Albert Schweitzer and others did. Determined to be a *vishvamanav*, a man who belonged to the universe, Gandhi disclaimed special ties to his wife, children and close relations, so much so that when a friend offered his son a scholarship to go to England, Gandhi advised him to give it to someone more qualified or in greater need. Even he, however, had close friends, co-workers, and fellow countrymen to whom he knew he owed special duties, which he conscientiously discharged. At the other extreme is the case of a poor and illiterate Indian woman who devotes her entire life to her family, works hard to raise her children, eats only after they have eaten and only what is left over, looks after her sick husband even when she is not herself in good health, and uses her negligible savings to help her even poorer kith and kin. Although narrow in range, her life has depth and commitment, and it would be wrong to say that it is not a worthy moral life simply because her moral world is limited to half a dozen individuals. Even she, however, is subject to certain general duties that devolve on her as a human being. She may not kill or rob her neighbours to benefit her family. And if she saw a child being beaten up by a bully, a girl being raped, or a drunkard drowning in a puddle, she would be morally remiss if she did nothing about it. Her general duties, both positive and negative, circumscribe the ways in which she should discharge her duties to her family.

Ethics of interdependence

Our discussion of general and special duties provides a useful framework for exploring the nature of global citizenship. Human beings are born and live within a particular political community, and are bound to it and to their fellow-citizens by special ties. They have a common interest in maintaining the territorial integrity and stability of their community, a common system of rights and obligations, and a general climate of civility and mutual trust, and must bear their share of the collective burden. They are expected to pay taxes which often benefit others, die for their country, defer their demands in order to meet the more urgent ones of others, and so on, and in return they legitimately expect that their sacrifices will be rewarded at an appropriate time. Since they grow up within and are profoundly shaped by their community, they also tend to identify with it, feel a special attachment to it, and define their identity in terms of it. When they call themselves British or French, they refer not only to their geographical location and political allegiance but also to their sense of common belonging and attachment to a particular group of people. They see their community as theirs, feel a particular sense of responsibility for it, experience pride or shame when it does or does not live up to certain ideals, and take interest in its problems. The sense of gratitude for the benefits received, the principle of fair play, enlightened self-interest and a feeling of identification with the community give rise to a wide range of obligations to their community and fellow-citizens. The latter have a special claim on them, and it is stronger than that of the

outsiders. No common life can be built and sustained if the members of a community felt no special sense of responsibility for each other and treated each other as they would outsiders.

It is sometimes argued that since political communities are contingent entities in the sense that their boundaries are arbitrary and membership an accident of birth, they cannot generate special moral obligations to fellow-citizens and the latter have no stronger claims than human beings elsewhere. The argument is deeply flawed. The territorial boundary of a political community is certainly contingent in the sense that it is often a product of wars, accidents or decisions by colonial rulers, and could easily have been drawn differently. However, over time it becomes integrated into the life of the community, forms a framework within which the latter builds a common life, and acquires moral and political significance. Territory is no longer an external and brute geographical fact but a home to the members of the community, the site of their history, a witness to their past struggles, triumphs and defeats. It demarcates them from others and forms an important part of their individual and collective identity. Their religion, literature, rituals, social practices, and cultural life in general are developed against its background and carry a distinct local and territorial flavour. The fact that I have this body rather than any other is a contingent fact of my life, but that does not alter the fact that I have come to identify with it, define myself in terms of it, and have a special relationship with it. A community's relation to its territory is broadly similar.

The argument that birth in a particular community is an accident of no moral significance is doubly mistaken. Accidents are not devoid of moral significance. The fact that I am born a human being is an accident, but that does not detract from the fact that my humanity is a source of claims and obligations in a way that the animal life is not. More importantly, birth is not an accident. It is often planned by one's parents and is an expression of their intention to widen their world by introducing a new member to it. And birth alone would not have culminated in a fully grown adult if the parents and the wider society had not welcomed and lovingly nurtured the infant and shaped it in a certain way. Birth is not just a physical occurrence but a social and cultural event, involving special ties with and hence appropriate moral claims on and obligations to the political community.

While, for these and other reasons, we do have special duties to our fellow-citizens, we also have duties to our fellow-humans, including the duties not to harm their well-being and to promote it within the limits of our capacities. As citizens, we should therefore define our collective well-being in terms that take full account of these duties. Pursuing goals that damage others' well-being and prevent them from leading minimally decent lives violates their equal rights to their well-being, and is inherently illegitimate. Furthermore, when others are prevented from pursuing their well-being by circumstances beyond their control, such as exiguous natural resources, poor technology, civil war, and a tyrannical form of government which they cannot easily dislodge, they need our help, and we have a duty to give it. Just as we have a duty to help a man being beaten up by a bully or starving for lack of food, we have a duty to help societies ravaged by warlords, tyrants and famine. The basis of the duty in each case is the same, to relieve human suffering and help others secure those primary goods without which no good life is possible. These duties are owed to human beings *qua* human beings and cannot be overridden by our special duties to our community.

I argued earlier that the general duty to help human beings in other societies arises out of our common humanity. In modern times it is reinforced by two additional factors, one historical, the other contemporary. Thanks to colonialism, many Western states are partly responsible for the conditions of life in other parts of the world. They designed and ran their economy to suit their interests, drew their territorial boundaries without regard to historical and ethnic considerations, imposed pliant political structures and leaders, and manipulated or created ethnic, religious and other divisions. Although colonial rule is now over and cannot be held responsible for all current ills, it ended in many cases barely three decades ago, a very short time in the history of nations. Even after it ended, the economic and political lives of ex-colonies continued to be dominated by Western powers. Indeed it is difficult to think of any developing country whose collective life was not manipulated by a Western power during the four decades of the Cold War. This is not at all to say that these countries were themselves innocent, far from it, but rather that Western powers were not wholly innocent either. Since at least some of the problems of the developing countries are caused by Western powers, the latter have an additional historically derived obligation to help these countries enjoy stable and decent lives.

This obligation has acquired a particular urgency in recent years. Thanks to the great technological advances of our age and the increasing global interdependence, human beings the world over have come closer than ever before and their interests are interwoven. Our actions directly or indirectly affect others' interests, and as moral beings we cannot be indifferent to their consequences. The subsidies that the rich nations give to their farmers and domestic industries, the tariffs they impose on imports from developing countries, the political protection and patronage they give to their multinationals, and the weak regime of regulations they impose on their international operations profoundly affect the well-being of millions in the rest of the world. Political and economic problems of the developing countries too have consequences outside their boundaries. Their civil wars affect the supply of vital raw materials, and hence the prosperity and well-being of the rest of the world including the rich West. The collapse of currency, fiscal mismanagement and an ill-advised monetary policy in one of them damages other economies. Although some economies affect others more, none is devoid of at least some impact on others, as we saw when the economic troubles of the East Asian countries impacted on those of the G7.

Our physical well-being is also interdependent. Disease and environmental damage know no boundaries, and one country's pollution or deforestation seriously affects the climate and hence the economic and physical well-being of others. Our moral and political interests too are interwoven, for the collapse of civil authority in distant parts of the world leads to a flow of refugees who knock on our doors and whom we cannot drive away as we would stray dogs or intruders. Thanks to the global reach of the media, the starvation and suffering in poorer parts of the world impinge on our moral consciousness and address us directly. We might choose to ignore them, but not without some sense of guilt or at least unease. We might blame them on the countries concerned, but that does not give us an easy conscience, for the suffering haunts us and gets under our skin. We feel angry and troubled, and believe that our own humanity is somehow diminished and our moral sensibility coarsened if we do nothing to relieve distress in other parts of the world. Feeble though it is so far, some concern for the suffering of unknown others in distant

lands is becoming an integral part of our moral consciousness, and paving the way for a vague but unmistakable sense of global moral community. It is this that explains the historically unique phenomenon of humanitarian aid, popular pressure on governments to do something to help societies in distress, great personal risks that aid workers, doctors, nurses, journalists and others take in unstable countries, and the global campaign to cancel the debts of poor countries.

Thanks to all this, we are now related to human beings in distant parts of the world in a way that has no parallel in history. Humankind is no longer just a biological species but a *moral* community increasingly bound together by a spirit of mutual concern, common interests, and a shared fate. Human beings entertain certain expectations of one another, especially of those in the affluent and powerful West because of their greater capacity to cause harm and offer help. And as the latter respond appropriately, the expectations acquire moral legitimacy, set new moral and political norms, and give rise to a new awareness of global obligations. As a result humankind is acquiring some of the broad features of a *political* community. The 'we' that constitutes and defines a political community is expanding to encompass those hitherto perceived as 'they', and the moral gap between general duties and special duties, between those to human beings in general and to our fellow-citizens, is beginning to narrow.

These and other changes in the contemporary world not only reinforce and add urgency to our general duty to other human beings but also give it a wholly new content. The traditional natural law and Christian moral theories which have shaped our thought for centuries maintained that human beings had certain natural duties to each other, such as keeping promises, not taking or harming their lives, and granting them hospitality. Our contemporary sense of moral obligation to people outside our community goes much further than this. Since most of their problems arise because their collective economic and political lives are in a desperate state, our duties to them also include helping them create the economic and political conditions needed to lead the good life. The quality of their collective life matters to us, and we cannot be indifferent to how it is organised and run. We cannot help them effectively by acting individually as when we give money to international charities, but only by collectively pressuring our governments to act in appropriate ways. In other words our duties now have a *political* content, and our relations to human beings in other parties of the world are politically mediated. This inescapable politicisation of our universal moral duty is new to our age, and forms the central moral premise of any well-conceived theory of politics and international relations.

We then have duties to members of our community as well as to outsiders. We cannot say that our obligations to humankind automatically trump those to our community on the ground that they cover more human beings or because the principle of impartiality so requires. I have already shown why this view is false. Nor can we say that our obligations to our own community automatically trump those to humankind at large on the ground that they are stronger, deeper, born out of special relations, or embedded in a web of greater expectations. I have already shown why this view too is false. The duties limit each other, and each needs to be so defined and discharged that it does not frustrate the other. This means that we should pursue our collective well-being in a manner that does not damage others', and conversely we should help others secure the basic conditions of the good life in all ways we can consistently with a due regard for the interests of our fellow-citizens.

Globally oriented citizenship

I have so far argued that we have moral duties to humankind, that they have a political content and character, and that they are best discharged through our political communities. This gives a new meaning to the familiar ideas of global citizenship and cosmopolitanism. The cosmos is not yet a *polis*, and we should not even try to make it one by creating a world state, which is bound to be remote, bureaucratic, oppressive, and culturally bland. If global citizenship means being a citizen of the world, it is neither practicable nor desirable. There is another sense, however, in which it is meaningful and historically relevant. Since the conditions of life of our fellow human beings in distant parts of the world should be a matter of deep moral and political concern to us, our citizenship has an inescapable global dimension, and we should aim to become what I might call a globally oriented citizen. A global or cosmopolitan citizen, one who claims to belong to the whole world, has no political home and is in a state of what Martha Nussbaum calls 'voluntary exile'.⁵ By contrast a globally oriented citizen has a valued home of his own, from which he reaches out to and forms different kinds of alliances with others having homes of their own. Globally oriented citizenship recognises both the reality and the value of political communities, not necessarily in their current form but at least in some suitably revised form, and calls for not cosmopolitanism but internationalism.

Internationalism respects the basic moral impulses lying at the heart of nationalism and cosmopolitanism while avoiding their pathologies. Like nationalism it accepts the legitimate place of the love of one's community in human life, but expands its range to include the love of, or at least respect and concern, for other communities. And while stressing our global duties, it avoids the obvious dangers of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism ignores special ties and attachments to one's community, is too abstract to generate the emotional and moral energy needed to live up to its austere imperatives, and can also easily become an excuse for ignoring the well-being of the community one knows and can directly influence in the name of an unrealistic pursuit of the abstract ideal of universal well-being. This is bad in itself but also has the further consequence of provoking a defensive reaction in the form of narrow nationalism. Nationalism and cosmopolitanism feed off and reinforce each other, and the limitations of one give pseudo-legitimacy to the other. Internationalism mediates between the two and offers a better alternative. With all their limitations, political communities in one form or another have long been an inescapable part of our life. They shape us, are centres of our loyalty and attachment, and constitute an important element in our self-definition. Since they are a source of moral and emotional energy, to ignore them is to deprive us of a vital moral resource. We should instead find ways of redefining, reorienting and building on them and using their resources for wider moral purposes.

In the light of our discussion, globally oriented citizenship has three important components. First, it involves constantly examining the policies of one's country and ensuring that they do not damage and, within the limits of its resources, promote the

⁵ Martha Nussbaum, 'Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism', in Joshua Cohen (ed.), *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1996).

interests of humankind at large. When our government props up dictatorships in other countries, supplies them dangerous weapons, corrupts, manipulates and destabilises vulnerable leaders, imposes unfavourable trade agreements, and in other all too familiar ways pursues narrowly selfish policies, we must challenge it by means of organised pressure and protests. Globally oriented citizenship thus calls for a democratic deepening of national citizenship, and is not its rival but necessary complement. As we saw, our universal duties to humankind can be best discharged through the mediating agency of the state, and we can be effective globally oriented citizens only by energising our national citizenship. It is a common experience that those who strongly identify with their community and feel a sense of responsibility for its actions are the most likely to feel ashamed and protest when it behaves badly. Apathetic citizens, who have no interest in the conduct of their government, are neither good national nor good global citizens.

Secondly, globally oriented citizenship involves an active interest in the affairs of other countries, both because human well-being everywhere should be a matter of moral concern to us and because it directly or indirectly affects our own. A globally oriented citizen has a strong sense of responsibility for the citizens of other countries, and feels addressed by their pleas for help. He has a duty to protest and mobilise international public opinion when governments in other parts of the world engage in genocide or ethnic cleansing, oppress their citizens or those in neighbouring countries, deny them basic rights, and in general damage their ability to lead the good life.

Thirdly, globally oriented citizenship involves an active commitment to create a just world order, one in which different countries, working together under fair terms of cooperation, can attend to their common interests in a spirit of mutual concern. Although it has long been clear, the murderous events of 11 September 2001 have made it blindingly obvious that peace is indivisible, that poverty and injustice in one part of the world profoundly affect the security and well-being of others, and that no country, however powerful, can treat with impunity the poor and vulnerable people in backward parts of the world as mere pawns in an international game. In an unjust and unequal world, no country can feel safe. We took decades to realise that peace and harmony within the country are indivisible, and that oppressed and alienated groups of citizens threaten the safety and well-being of the rest. We need to learn a similar lesson at the global level.

Many imaginative economic and political ideas for creating a just world have been canvassed for years, but they have largely been shelved because of moral inertia, lack of political will, corrupt political leaders in thrall to corporate interests, and absence of adequate pressure by developing countries. James Tobin proposed a few years ago that a tax of 0.05 per cent on foreign exchange transactions would gather close to \$100bn a year. It would not only deter economically damaging speculative transactions but also generate most of the money needed to ensure food, primary education and public health to every human being on this planet. I recently suggested in a debate in the House of Lords that a voluntary tax of one penny in a pound could be collected from those willing to pay it, and that it should include not just the affluent West but also the other parts of the world to encourage a sense of global responsibility for global well-being. Rough calculations indicate that if a quarter of the middle classes the world over were to volunteer, we would generate upwards of £800m a year. A Europeanwide lottery of the kind that exists in Britain, with its

profits earmarked for global development, could generate over £20m a week. Democratising the structure of the IMF and the World Bank, creating a Global Central Bank, transworld taxes on the global commons such as deep seabeds, flight paths, sea lanes and ocean fishing areas, and supraterritorial corporate taxation to prevent transborder companies from avoiding taxes altogether, are also worth considering. Similar institutional changes at the political level have also been proposed, and many of these are both practicable and likely to lead to a more transparent and democratic conduct of international relations. These include such things as the reform of the United Nations especially the Security Council, reform of private and public international law, giving greater investigatory powers to the United Nations, a world assembly of prominent citizens and NGOs, an international ombudsman supported by regional ombudsmen, a global forum where national governments can be required to explain their policies, and an international body that can be a dependable source of impartial information and views on contentious issues.

My concern, however, is not to canvass this or that proposal but to emphasise that an inescapably interdependent world such as ours calls for new types of global economic and political institutions. They help create a just political and economic order, articulate and consolidate the sense of universal moral obligations, and could over time become new centres of global loyalty. Just as the welfare state embodies the spirit of national solidarity and nurtures the national community, these institutions embody and nurture the spirit of global solidarity. Indeed we can use them to create a global welfare state guaranteeing food, health and other basic needs to all human beings the world over by means of revenues collected by the kinds of measures I mentioned earlier and supervised by federally structured and democratically accountable global political institutions.

Global institutions are often resisted on the grounds that they detract from the sovereignty of the state. The resistance is unjustified. Since we have duties to people outside our community, they impose moral constraints on state actions. Sovereignty in the sense of an absolute moral or legal right to pursue national interest in disregard of the interests of others is a morally incoherent notion. It is also politically impracticable, for no state today has the capacity to pursue its national interest as it pleases. All states today are enmeshed in a complex system of interdependence. A country's currency is often at the mercy of international speculators with the power to destabilise its economy. No country can ensure order and protect its borders on its own against the internationally linked terrorist moments. And nor can it deal on its own with the problems of pollution, drug trafficking, climate change, global warming, and spread of contagious disease.

Every state therefore is faced with two choices. Either it goes on its own and avoids international organisations and obligations that restrict its capacity for unrestrained action, or it cooperates with others and accepts the concomitant restraints on its freedom of action. In the first case, it retains its formal sovereignty but remains helplessly subject to the constraints of external forces and consequences of others' actions. In the second, it compromises its formal sovereignty but acquires the power to influence others' actions, control the forces of the market, and help shape the environment in which it operates. On any rational calculation, the latter represents a better trade-off. It limits the state's formal rights but expends its effective power, and it is the latter alone that ultimately matters. Contrary to what the traditional theory of the state asserts, external sovereignty admits of degrees, can

increase at one level while diminishing at another, and can and should be pooled and shared.

Like the state's external sovereignty, its internal sovereignty too needs to be rethought. The state is an apparatus of organised control and cannot be equated with the totality of its people. Its interests are not always the same as theirs, and its sovereignty does not amount to the sovereignty of its people unless the state is democratically constituted. When a state denies its citizens basic rights or declares a war on some of them and claims immunity to external pressure or intervention in the name of sovereignty, its sovereignty is clearly of no benefit to its citizens. Indeed the sovereignty of the state is here usurped by the executive, and undermines the sovereignty of the people. Even in a liberal democracy, the internal sovereignty is not an unmixed blessing. A state's membership of a regional organisation or acceptance of international covenants restricts its internal sovereignty, but might confer rights on its citizens that they might otherwise not enjoy. When, for example, the European Union issues directives requiring its member states to protect privacy, ensure equality of the sexes in the workplace, enact stronger anti-racist legislation, and control pollution, it expands the rights of ordinary citizens. The national governments or vested interests might complain of the loss of national sovereignty, but this is not how most citizens see the matter. In short, we should not fetishise sovereignty and treat it as an unmixed good, but look behind and beyond it to see if it serves worthwhile goals. And nor should we equate freedom and sovereignty and argue that a state lacking absolute internal and external sovereignty is not free. Just as we have learned to appreciate that no state today is a nation state in the sense of a culturally homogeneous and unified community, we need to realise that no state today can be sovereign in the sense of an unrestrained freedom of internal and external action and that the customary association of state and sovereignty needs to be reconsidered.

Globally oriented citizenship calls for a global ethic, but the content of that ethic is far more complex than is often appreciated. Ethics is concerned with human well-being, and the latter has two interrelated components. As shown earlier, some are universal and must be available to all, such as the satisfaction of basic needs, basic capacities, freedom from terror, a stable social environment, basic liberties, and a popularly accountable government. Others vary from community to community, depending on their visions of the good life and their substantive or 'thick' moralities. Subject to certain non-negotiable universal moral values, we must respect this diversity, both because it means much to those involved and because it adds to the richness and the beauty of the world. Different societies are bound to incorporate universal moral principles differently into their ways of life and prioritise and trade them off differently. Free speech, for example, is a universal value, but its limits might be set differently in different societies depending on their historical circumstances and cultural traditions. Some might allow pornography, others not. Some might treat it as a more or less absolute value; others might disallow utterances likely to incite racial or religious hatred, demean vulnerable groups, and cause ethnic hostility or social tensions. Life, again, is a universal value, but societies disagree about when it begins and ends and what respect for it entails. Some societies might allow, whereas others might ban, abortion and euthanasia; some might give rights to the dead but not others; some might take respect for life to involve right to the satisfaction of basic needs, whereas others might extend it to include the right to

employment as well. Equality of the sexes too is a universal value, but its realisation need not take the strong feminist or even its current Western form.

Global ethic then should not institutionalise a particular vision of the good life and unduly narrow the range of legitimate diversity. It should respect and accommodate multiple ethical traditions within the framework of a universally acceptable body of moral principles. Liberal universalists sometimes fail to appreciate the importance of combining a singular morality with a multiple ethics. Brian Barry, for example, insists on a fairly thick set of universal moral principles, and limits permissible diversity to such things as traffic rules, social manners, and conventions of politeness.⁶ Richard Rorty makes a similar mistake. In his view global solidarity should be based on the fact that human beings are fundamentally alike, that their similarities are far more important than their differences, and that the good life is the same for all. Accordingly he argues that cultural diversity is only of marginal importance and should be 'simply ignored for the purpose of designing' political and economic institutions. Rorty's view is deeply flawed. He fails to see that since human similarities and differences interpenetrate and cannot be compartmentalised, we are similar in dissimilar ways or human in our own unique manner. His view, further, cannot cope with the reality of deep differences. It not only does not appreciate their value but feels positively threatened by them, and confronts us with a false choice between the two great values of respect for diversity on the one hand and equality and solidarity on the other. Since different societies represent different visions of the good life and complement and enrich each other, global solidarity in a multicultural world is best built on both their shared values and differences.

As the world becomes interdependent, we constantly encounter unexpected forms of otherness, unfamiliar ways of life, apparently strange bodies of beliefs and practices. This frightens us, deprives us of our bearings, and generates a moral and cultural panic. We suppress the diversity and tensions in our own and other ways of life, homogenise their identities, and turn them into sharply different, mutually exclusive and even antagonistic entities. We then respond to this false and mutually reinforcing disjunction by either seeking to shape others in our own image or embracing a shallow relativism that rules out all meaningful contacts with them. There is nothing to be said for either response. One is arrogant and expansionist, the other insular and cowardly. Both alike are sustained by the fear of the other, and ill-equipped to sustain the spirit of globally oriented citizenship in a multicultural world. What we need instead is openness to the other, an appreciation of the immense range and variety of human existence, an imaginative grasp of what both distinguishes and unites human beings, and the willingness to enter into a non-hegemonic dialogue.

Globally oriented citizenship thus calls for new kinds of moral and political virtues that have received little attention in the traditional discussion of citizenship. It requires active sympathy for human suffering wherever it occurs, both as an expression of our shared humanity and as a form of enlightened self-interest. It also requires empathy, the capacity to enter into the inner lives of others, to cherish them as self-determining subjects with ideas of their own about how they wish to live, and to see the world the way they do. It also requires the disposition and the ability to

⁶ Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp. 286f.

enter into a robust and critical dialogue with other cultures, civilisation and religions, learning from them what is valuable and challenging what is dubious or indefensible in them. Globally oriented citizenship thus calls for a delicate balance between several complementary but also potentially conflicting virtues, such as appreciation of our common humanity and of our deep differences, courage of conviction as well as humility, a firm sense of our moral identity and a willingness to revise it, internationalism as well as patriotism, rootedness in our community as well as openness to others. How to cultivate and institutionalise these and related virtues is one of the most important challenges of our age. Unless we meet it, our century might prove to be even more brutal and violent than the one we have just left behind.